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Bachelard would agree that we must speak to one another, and speak
especially to the least little ones among us. She would agree, too, that it is
the mission of the Church to do so and that the philosophy of our academies cannot supplant that mission. There is not space enough to explore
her ecclesiology. One might at least note, though, that her Church celebrates the sacraments, each of which celebrates life. A reason subservient
to the idols of the tribe continues to find one such sacrament, a Sacrament
of Resurrection, an insuperable scandal. How is it that Jesus dares to say,
“unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, you have
no life in you: he who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life,
and I will raise him up on the last day” (John 6:53–54)?
A closing link? Keynes tells us that in the end we are all dead. With a
Resurrection ethic and its imagination, we could counter that everything
depends on “the end.” Might we not propose that “it is immortals whom
we joke with, work with, marry, snub, and exploit—immortal horrors or everlasting splendors” (C. S. Lewis, Weight of Glory [Harper Collins, 2001], 47)?
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That Christ was a person with both a divine and a human nature is for
Aquinas a fact that faith commands us to accept, but that a theologian also
needs to understand as fully as possible. In his lucid, deep, and beautifully
written book, Michael Gorman sets out to investigate Aquinas’s life-long
attempt to understand the incarnation of God in Christ.
The book is composed of six chapters. The first and the second chapter
introduce the reader to the key concepts of person and nature, and argue for
the interpretation that “Aquinas is best read as thinking that the off-the-rack
philosophical notion of nature is inadequate for Christological purposes.
Something tailor-made—a modified notion of ‘nature’ is required” (9). Such
Thomistic-type of nature will include, writes Gorman, what an Aristoteliantype of nature includes, and in addition “accidents, individuating principles,
and so on”; in the case of a human nature, accidents such as that of speaking
Aramaic, which is “connected to and rooted in Christ’s human nature, even
if it does not belong to that nature” (45). The reason why Aquinas feels the
need to introduce this expanded notion of nature is to be able to express all
that Christology requires him to say about Christ, which a more restricted,
Aristotelian understanding of nature would not cover. Naturally this move
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will strike the reader of Aquinas as ad hoc, and Gorman explicitly acknowledges this (10); he further remarks, more generally, on the “lightness” with
which Aquinas holds metaphysical models and on his rather “opportunistic
and occasional” way of using comparisons with natural substances in his
Christological discussions (44).
So, how are we to proceed in our study of Aquinas’s views on the metaphysics of the hypostatic union? It might be tempting to think that this
is a game with shifting goalposts: Aquinas’s stated intent is to understand
the incarnation, but half-way as it were into the investigation it seems to
have become that of being able to talk about it according to the teaching
of the Creed. Gorman however steers away from this approach, which
he would surely deem to be unfair to Aquinas. He states forthrightly:
Aquinas “truly is a philosopher and theologian of genius, someone from
whom anyone has a lot to learn” (6); in the book, he sets out to prove this
claim true. But interestingly, the resulting view is not that of a genius that
has (improbably) solved what metaphysicians and theologians alike still
consider a deeply difficult philosophical conundrum; rather, Aquinas is
presented as engaging with the problem as best he can and within the
boundaries of faith. Gorman approaches Aquinas’s texts with exquisite
sensitivity—aware that the way they would have been read by a contemporary of Aquinas, the way they strike us twenty-first-century readers, the
way they speak to a Christian reader, and the way they are approached
by non-Christian readers, are all different. Gorman engages with all these
viewpoints, thus offering an interpretation of Aquinas that will be of interest to readers of all stripes, including the analytic-minded twenty-firstcentury philosopher who will appreciate a fair (and textually grounded)
assessment of what Aquinas achieved and did not achieve in his take on the
metaphysics of the hypostatic union.
Chapter 3 raises interesting issues concerning the compositeness of
Christ. Christ for Aquinas is “more composite than Socrates. He has all
the complexity a normal human has (a multiplicity of limbs, of organs,
a composition of body and soul, and so forth), and he also has the compositeness of being both human and divine” (43). But on account of what
is then Christ one substance, for Aquinas? This issue is not addressed by
Gorman. Yet, one would think it is an important one, especially for an
Aristotelian like Aquinas; even in the case of Socrates, who has one nature
only, the question of what unifies a hylomorphic compound into one substance is a challenging one (and has divided commentators since antiquity). Aristotle’s stance (as I interpret him, with other scholars) is that the
substantial form unifies the substance into one by re-identifying the parts
that make it up: a hand severed from a living being is not a hand anymore,
but in name only, says Aristotle. A hand that is functionally attached to
the body and a hand that is severed from it have different identification
criteria, hence there are different types of thing. Everything that makes up
Socrates will depend for its identity criteria on the form of human being of
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Socrates. But this Aristotelian line of thinking cannot apply to Christ, who
has two natures. So, is Christ a heap of constituents? And if not, why not?
On Aquinas’s view, it is as if each nature determined the number of
Christ’s constituents independently from the other nature, with the result that
in Christ there are many human constituents but no divine one: “On Aquinas’s way of thinking, to ascribe divine simplicity to Christ is to say that
Christ has no multiplicity of constituents derived from his divine nature.
That in no way excludes his having a second nature, nor does it exclude
his having composition within that nature or composition of that nature
with something extra-essential” (57). On the issue of the number of Christ,
in chapter 5 Gorman expresses Aquinas’s views thus: “In the hypostatic
union, humanity is joined to the Word in such a way that afterwards there
is the same number of persons as before [i.e., one], but it is not joined in
such a way that humanity and divinity somehow team up to create a new
nature” (52; Gorman has more to say about the relation between human
and divine nature in chapter 6, on “The Consistency of Christology”). So,
oneness of person in Christ does not entail the oneness of Christ (“a person . . . for Aquinas is a special kind of substance, a substance that has a
rational nature” [19]).
What makes Aquinas’s position even more puzzling, is that it looks as
if he sees unity of action in Christ, even if not substantial unity. Gorman
reports that “For example, Aquinas says that when Christ touches a leper
and heals him, he does the touching in virtue of his human nature, while
he does the healing in virtue of his divine nature. These are not activities
that merely go on side-by-side, but activities that make up one divinehuman action” (42). But how can a non-substantially-unified composite
entity like Christ perform one action, and how can that action be “divinehuman”? Gorman does not engage with these issues.
In chapter 6, Gorman investigates Aquinas’s views on the consistency
of Christology, namely, the attribution of contradictory qualifications to
Christ, arguing for the conclusion “that we cannot know, in detail and with
confidence, what Aquinas’s thoughts were on the consistency problem: His
remarks are so brief and underdeveloped that a certain kind of agnosticism
is in order. We can, however think through what kind of view would make
sense on the basis of what he says” (127). A substantial part of the chapter
is devoted to a fair-minded, sophisticated and thorough discussion of the
mainstream interpretation of this aspect of Aquinas’s thought. According to such interpretation, called the Mereological Replacement Strategy,
“When Aquinas says that X is F qua R, he is using the qua-phrase to point
to some part of X, namely R, and he is saying that the feature F belongs unqualifiedly to the part R and only qualifiedly to X as a whole—the reason
it belongs only qualifiedly to the whole is that it is borrowed by the whole
from the part” (128). The aim here is to render the contradiction as inconsistent as the unity of the parts of Christ into one substance. For reasons
of space, I cannot here reconstruct Gorman’s arguments against this interpretation; and his alternative take on Aquinas’s use of qua-statements. But I
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want to briefly introduce Gorman’s speculative suggestion of how Aquinas
might have thought about consistency in Christology, even if “there is no
way to be sure” (152).
Gorman suggests that Aquinas might have distinguished two ways of
predicating attributes to Christ: a “weak” and a “strong” one. Weak predication is an elliptic or incomplete way of talking of Christ. To illustrate:
“From the fact that impassibility can be predicated weakly of Christ qua
divine, it does not follow that Christ is impassible; it would follow only
if we added the premise that Christ is only divine, i.e., that he has no
other nature” (153). Thus, inconsistent features can be weakly predicated
of Christ without inconsistency, not because weak predication allows
anything to be predicated of anything, as if it were a free lunch with no
ontological implications, but rather because weak predications are opaque
with respect to their subject.
In the book, Gorman argues for the merits of an interpretative method
that avoids the Scylla of “stop[ping] at the words and miss[ing] the chance
to grasp fully the ideas behind them” and the Charybdis of “jumping too
quickly to struggling with the Big Ideas without dealing with nitty-gritty
of historical analysis; these miss the chance to learn something new from
their authors” (6–7). “If we really want to engage in a historically accurate
reading of Aquinas, we will have to be as sharp as we can speculatively”
(6), and speculatively sharp he surely is. Even if there appear to be still
more issues left unaddressed by Aquinas than the ones Gorman identifies,
Gorman does an excellent job at explicating Aquinas’s texts, reconstructing his ways of thinking, and engaging the modern reader in a nimble and
argumentative book that will remain a touchstone for years to come for
students and researchers in medieval philosophy, philosophy of religion,
and the history of metaphysics.
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John A. Keller’s Being, Freedom, and Method is a 401-page volume consisting
of sixteen chapters (excluding the introduction and a lengthy concluding
meditation) divided into five parts. The chapters include contributions
from some of the best philosophers in the field (twenty in all) in a very wellorganized festschrift to Peter van Inwagen. The parts include Being, Freedom, God, Method, and Afterword. With the exception of van Inwagen’s
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